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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the importance of the Navy's Science and Technology
(S&T) budget. The relevance and value of the budget are addressed. The
composition and size of the Navy's S&T budget between 1984 and 1994 are evaluated
as a share of the Department of Defense (DoD) and Navy Research, Development,
Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) budgets. The Navy S&T budget is examined from
the presidential request through appropriations over a ten year period. There is an
analysis of Naval Technology Transfer Programs and an examination of Advanced
Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) and Enhanced Technology Demonstrations
(ETDs). Five major conclusions are drawn. First, the period between 1984 and 1987
generally saw DoD RDT&E, Navy RDT&E, and Navy S&T generally increase.
Second, for the period 1988 and 1994, DoD and Navy RDT&E funding generally
decreased while Navy S&T generally increased. Third, for the 1989 through 1993
period there was significantly more conflict between Congress and the executive
branch over Navy S&T funding levels. Fourth, technology transfer programs
represent an increasing constraint on S&T procurement. Fifth, ATDs and ETDs
have generally increased their share of the Navy Advanced Technology Development
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This chapter describes this thesis' research questions, scope, methodology, and
chapter organization.
A. OBJECTIVES
This thesis identifies trends occurring within the Navy's Science and Technology
(S&T) budget. These trends will be explored by comparing the President's budget
submission and the congressional response. The congressional response will be
examined at two levels, authorizations and appropriations. This information is
relevant to theories concerning congressional incentives and focuses on an area of
the Department of Defense (DoD) budget that has received little attention.
Investment in S&T is essential to build a prosperous economy and maintain
national security. Each armed service has a Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation (RDT&E) budget. The RDT&E process moves technology from basic
research to acquisition. Each stage in this process emphasizes a different aspect in
technology development. The S&T category involves investigating new technologies
that have a variety of applications. When a specific application is in sight, S&T shifts
the emphasis to obtaining information about the design and engineering of a new
system.
Congress has tried to alter the way research is purchased so the economy's
civilian segment can benefit from military research dollars. Two examples will be
presented. First, in 1982 Congress passed the Small Business Innovative Research
(SBIR) Act to encourage small businesses to become a principal technological
innovation source. The Act attempted to increase small business participation in
federal research and development. Second, the 1992 Defense Conversion,
Reinvestment, and Transition Act by means of the Technology Reinvestment Project
(TRP) aimed at breaking down barriers preventing the flow of military technology
to commercial markets.
DoD is attempting to take advantage of high technology. These efforts to
develop high technology demonstrations should improve military capabilities while
enhancing the industrial base. The Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs)
and Enhanced Technology Demonstrations (ETDs), are prototyping systems to test
new concepts. After identifying new high leverage technology that will provide a
definitive advantage for the armed forces, the U.S. will build a demonstration system
to test the concept. The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)
program is designed to rapidly transition maturing technologies into improved
military operational capability.
B. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following research questions will be addressed:
1. During the past decade, the Navy's S&T budget has undergone significant
changes. What S&T funding trends have become apparent? An anticipated
trend is that budget requests have exceeded authorizations and
appropriations.
2. Is there a significant difference between funding requests for Navy S&T and
congressional authorizations and appropriations for Navy S&T?
3. When considering the degree of congressional intervention on the budget
process for Navy S&T, did Congress adhere to their traditional roles for the
authorization and appropriation processes?
4. Do congressionally mandated technology transfer programs such as SBIR or
TRP restrict military procurement decisions?
5. What is the purpose of taking advantage of high technology by refining of
the technology development integration process? These efforts include
SBIR, Navy Dual-Use Technology Programs, ACTDs, ATDs, and ETDs.
C. SCOPE
The RDT&E budget includes S&T. Normally, RDT&E, procurement, and
military construction are referred to as the investment budget. In this thesis, only
RDT&E will be examined. The changes between individual S&T accounts relative
to RDT&E are important for examining investment policy within congressional policy
constraints. The thesis will address the Navy's S&T budget as a share of the total
DoD and Navy RDT&E budget. To provide perspective, ten years of funding levels
will be contrasted.
This thesis will examine Congressional fiscal oversight, including changes to the
executive branch's proposed funding for S&T during the legislative budget process.
This thesis will also examine the SBIR program's effect on the Navy's overall
flexibility in deciding where to procure research.
D. METHODOLOGY
This thesis will examine congressional changes to the executive branch's budget
request for Navy S&T and DoD RDT&E. Data from the Naval Comptroller's Office
and reports from the conference committees for authorization and appropriation are
used to explore and contrast ten years of budgetary adjustments to the President's
budget submission. This information answers various questions regarding fiscal
scrutiny and S&T budgetary control.
The analysis of S&T funding covers the period from FY 84 to FY 94. This
period reflects the budgets of three administrations: Reagan, Bush, and Clinton.
Constant dollars are used for the evaluation process.
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II, "The Importance of the S&T Budget," will provide background
concerning S&T. Congressional interest in and impact on the S&T budget, the
importance of the DoD S&T budget, and technological base preservation are
addressed.
Chapter III, "Defense Science and Technology Budget," will address current
defense budget requests developed from 1984 to 1994. This chapter will also contrast
these budget requests with Congressional authorizations and appropriations. All
S&T accounts will be examined separately. The 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a accounts will be
compared to Navy RDT&E and DoD RDT&E to indicate their relative movements.
Chapter IV, "The Nature of Congressional Intervention in S&T," will look at
the congressional changes and alterations that have been made to the Navy S&T
budget request over the past ten years. The concept of technology transfer will be
discussed. This chapter will also discuss the SBIR program, Navy Dual-Use Program
acquisition, and ACID. SBIR's and TRP's impact on the Navy's budget will be
examined.
Chapter V, "The Significance of Advanced Prototypes," will examine the
implication of advanced prototypes on the budget, specifically the 6.3a account.
There will be an analysis of Navy ADTs and ETDs funding.
Chapter IV, "Conclusions," will summarize the analysis and findings from the
previous chapters. Trends will be identified, implications drawn, and suggestions for
further study offered.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE S&T BUDGET
A. INTRODUCTION
Since the dawn of the Cold War, the United States has invested in S&T to
support an arms race with the former Soviet Union. With the collapse of the USSR,
the U.S. is now the predominant global power. The clarity of American security
objectives owed much to the singularity of the Soviet threat in a bi-polar world.
Global technology-based competition has supplanted the arms race and could be the
greatest threat to U.S. security. Political and military alliances are no longer as
simple as democracy versus communism or free market versus state-run enterprise.
The national security environment that the U.S. is now entering is less defined and
more unstable, with many widespread threats.
Regional powers pose a relatively larger menace to U.S. national interests and
security. Potential adversaries that obtain sophisticated weapons through technology
proliferation and foreign arms sales constitute a growing threat. Deadly weapons are
already finding their way into widely dispersed and unpredictable hands. Potential
enemies may obtain advanced commercial technology for military applications. The
U.S. technological advantage on the battlefield could erode. These factors will
demand flexible and creative responses from the U.S. defense industrial base.
In the 1992 National Military Strategy of the U.S., then Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, proposed that the "United States must
continue to offset quantitative advantages, to minimize risk to U.S. forces, and to
enhance the potential for swift, decisive termination of conflict." The general also
noted that technological superiority is a key element of deterrence and that it
enhances combat effectiveness and reduces loss of personnel and equipment in war.
[Ref. l:p. 10] In light of a changing world scenario, a review of S&T is warranted.
B. BACKGROUND
Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara put in place a DoD R&D pro-
cess composed of several budget categories in order of increasing technological
maturity. This sequential transition of R&D investment starts at Basic Research
(6.1), Exploratory Development (6.2), Advanced Technology Development (6.3a),
Advanced Development (6.3b), Full-Scale Development (6.4), and finally ends in
procurement. This process was created to bring financial responsibility to an
enormous and complex acquisition process. This process can best be described as
a pipeline through which systems move. Program categories 6.1 through 6.4
represent DoD's RDT&E budget. Program categories 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a constitute
the S&T portion of the DoD budget. [Ref. 2:pp. 48-52] Program categories 6.1 and
6.2 are referred to as the Technology Base. [Ref. 3:pp. N-l & N-2]
To illustrate the differences between categories, Basic Research deals with
general properties such as material sciences, aerodynamics, or chemical thermo-
dynamics. Exploratory Development involves lab bench tests of particular
components, such as a compressor or a turbine. Advanced Technology Development
demonstrates components working together. Core engine components operating with
an application, e.g., an aircraft or tank, is an example of Advanced Development.
Full-Scale Engineering development demonstrates the product prototype and
associated manufacturing processes and controls. [Ref. 2:pp. 48-52]
In the mid-1960's, policies were established to manage new weapon systems
acquisition. They applied visible cost accounting and cost performance evaluations
to the DoD weapon system management process. Under this policy, technology is
carried by the acquisition process. Each system's cost includes the prorated costs of
research and development. These R&D costs are allocated to weapon systems by
defense firms as a part of those systems' production costs. This was a natural
consequence of the cost-effectiveness criteria and policies developed during the
McNamara era. [Ref. 4:p. 86]
As a rough rule, universities tend to concentrate on Basic Research, service
laboratories on Applied Research, and industry on Development and Engineering.
The research phase involves investigating new technologies that might have several
applications. When a specific application is identified, e.g., a weapon system,
significant development and engineering work is still required to incorporate the
technology. [Ref. 2:p. 50]
Exploratory and Advanced Development provide data about the design and
engineering of a new system. Virtually all engineering and development are
performed by the private sector. These contractors have invaluable experience in
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applying knowledge to the production process. [Ref. 2:p. 51] The information
provided in stages 6.2 and 6.3 allows managers to make production decisions
concerning a system with reasonable confidence about schedule, performance, and
cost. [Ref. 2:p. 50] The purpose of 6.3a, 6.3b, and 6.4 is to advance technology to
a maturity level where it can be placed into service. [Ref. 4:p. 90]
C. CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST AND IMPACT
DoD's RDT&E budget invites congressional interest and intervention for two
reasons: the sheer size of the DoD budget for RDT&E and the political sensitivity
concerning science and technology policy. For FY 94, DoD will spend $39 billion on
RDT&E; $14 billion of which will be spent on S&T. [Ref. 3:p. II] That is an
enormous amount of resources. Furthermore, these defense programs are
discretionary dollars. It is relatively easy to modify the president's S&T budget
proposal, in part because the budget submission does not explicitly state S&T
priorities. Congressional committees normally do not consider the S&T budget for
all federal agencies at once. Although Congress does not specifically authorize or
appropriate based upon broad categories such as total U.S. R&D funding, it is aware
of the totals for various categories, such as Army or Navy 6.1 funding, and may
attempt to balance these categories. [Ref. 5:pp. 8-12]
Second, defense RDT&E spending is a politically salient issue that generates
much debate. [Ref. 5:pp. 8-12] Throughout our country's recent history, technology
has been seen as the driving force behind the nation's economic growth. Since the
1970s, it increasingly seems as if U.S. manufacturing has been losing its competitive
edge. The U.S. lead in many industries has been lost to other industrialized nations.
Those who support an industrial policy cite these declining industries as ripe for
government support. Industrial policy advocates observe that most other
industrialized nations have instituted government policies to support industrial
sectors. They assert that this support has undermined U.S. international
competitiveness in some technologies. Opponents of industrial policy question
whether a centralized industrial policy is really effective. They fear that such
national planning would represent unwarranted government intrusion into the private
sector and adversely affect our industrial competitiveness.
The defense RDT&E budget represents both investment for defense technology
and a potential contribution to the civilian technological effort. Faced with fewer
federal funds to support civilian S&T efforts, the DoD S&T budget represents a
lucrative vehicle for that purpose. Military research efforts that also have civilian
applications are commonly referred to as dual-use technologies. [Ref. 2:pp. 35-40]
Within DoD's RDT&E budget, S&T draws particular emphasis. This interest
is generated by three factors. First, an investment in S&T is perceived as essential
for addressing national needs and objectives. Second, S&T breakthroughs and
developments in many areas of science and engineering are likely to yield widespread
economic and other benefits. Many in Congress believe that programs such as SBIR
or TRP facilitate this technology transfer. Third, there are specific national
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emergencies that require support for S&T investments aimed at solutions. An
example would be developing technology to aid in environmental cleanup. [Ref.
6:pp. 20-25]
In spite of the interest S&T generates, the realities of the federal budget deficit
constrain the DoD S&T budget. As funding decreases, fewer funds are available for
defense related S&T. Using DoD S&T funds for non-defense priorities would
further compromise defense related S&T. In times of reduced weapon system
procurement, it is unreasonable to expect private industry to help offset these
decreases by independently investing in unique military S&T for DoD's long term
benefit. The DoD S&T base must be viewed as vital. The long term investment in
human resources and facilities required to establish a defense S&T capability will be
difficult to reconstitute at a later time. [Ref. 7:p. 23]
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DoD S&T BUDGET
1. Critical Technologies
In addition to decreasing defense budgets, another trend affecting the
DTEB is the growing importance of technology to national power. The increasing
technological capability and economic power of Western European nations, Japan,
and other rapidly growing Asian nations challenge the technological hegemony of the
United States. Although America is still dominant in many areas, there is an
increasing risk that this nation may lose its leadership position in some technologies
essential for national security and economic prosperity.
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These key or critical defense technologies are the most important for
ensuring the long-term qualitative superiority of U.S. weapon systems. [Ref. 17:p. 2]
Despite a growing concern about critical technology, the U.S. Armed Forces no
longer dominate the industrial development of most high technology defense
products. Continually increasing commercial demand for these high technology
products have made DoD a less important customer. Additionally, defense
acquisition practices for advanced product and process technologies has been
surpassed by commercial practice. DoD acquisition practices have not evolved to
take advantage of technological innovations while commercial concerns have
integrated innovations such as just in time inventories. The result for DoD is that
it generally pays more for less advanced products. [Ref. 18:pp. 22-24]
While DoD has long had an active S&T program, the specific focus on
critical technologies is a relatively recent development. The U.S. has traditionally led
the world in advanced technology R&D and continues to do so. Nevertheless, U.S.
defense and commercial producers have often lost out to foreign competitors in
capitalizing on U.S. technological developments with commercially viable products
and fielded weapon capabilities. A 1990 Department of Commerce report suggests
that, if current trends continue through the year 2000, the U.S. could lag behind
Japan in most emerging technologies and trail the Western European Community in
several. [Ref. 17:p. 15]
Nevertheless, many maintain that current defense procurement policies
do not foster a healthy defense industry R&D capability in a time of reduced weapon
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system acquisition. Specifically targeting these limited defense dollars to maintain
a viable DTIB is one goal of the Clinton Administration. The ACID program is a
Clinton Administration initiative supporting the defense industrial base. Current
military programs in the 6.3a account, such as ATDs and ETDs, are efforts to target
defense dollars to maintain a strong DTIB. Despite this effort, many critical defense
contractors might fail or leave the defense industry.
2. Dual-Use Technologies
There has been a move toward augmenting federal support for
technologies that are deemed critical. Lists of critical civilian and defense
technologies display significant overlap. This suggests to some that government
funding should support dual-use technology development. Dual-use technologies
provide an opportunity for defense firms to market technologies to the commercial
sector. This could breath new life into these struggling defense industries. [Ref.
19:pp. 296-314]
In FY 90, DoD laboratories accounted for over 30 percent of DoD's
federal funds for basic research, applied research and exploratory development, and
development funding. [Ref. 2:pp. 50-51] Much of the technology developed in
federal laboratories has commercial as well as defense applications. This suggests
that federal laboratories might work more closely with the private sector. In-house
R&D could reflect industry's needs as well as those in government. [Ref. 19:p. 297]
The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), formerly the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), has supported high-risk, leading-edge
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technology development necessary to meet military requirements. ARPA has been
successful in stimulating the commercialization of new technologies originally
developed for DoD. [Ref. 19:p. 298] Through ARPA, the government is centrally
targeting industries and implementing a minimal industrial policy to support defense
sector firms.
Mr. Douglas E. Olesen, President and CEO of Battelle Memorial
Institute, noted that companies bringing the best technologies to the marketplace the
quickest will have a competitive advantage. In his view, that is why investments in
technology are among the most critical investments industry is making today. [Ref.
20:p. 210] After Battelle won a contract to run a Department of Energy Laboratory
in 1965, it discovered one researcher working on technology that would store
digitized music on a disk, to be replayed with a laser. Battelle supported this
technology throughout the '70s. It eventually came to market as the compact disc.
[Ref. 20:pp. 209-212]
President Clinton argues that the nation must go beyond past debates in
which "some thought government alone could do everything and others claimed
government could do nothing." Clinton states that the government can aid industry.
Government, in this view, can promote dual-use research and promote civilian use
of technology developed for military purposes. [Ref. 13:pp. 1-3]
3. The Foreign Threat
While many factors affect the rate of technical progress, the
commercialization and diffusion of products and processes have often been cited as
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a problem in the ability of U.S. industries to compete technologically. The benefits
of pure science in the U.S. can be captured by any nation. For the cost of a scientific
journal subscription, another nation can obtain the latest technological innovation.
The payoff for basic research is long in coming, the results sometimes not
marketable, and the rewards often diffused among many users. Yet, while there is
risk that performance of basic research will produce nothing or minimally useful
results, it appears there is a significant relationship between the amount of basic
research a firm conducts as a portion of its total R&D budget and increases in
productivity. Technological advancement permits more efficient ways to produce
existing products and to develop new ones. [Ref. 19:p. 296]
In the mid-1970s, U.S. corporations began losing the industrial
preeminence they have enjoyed since the end of World War II. The result has been
an apparent increase in foreign technology leadership, U.S. purchases from foreign
sources, and increased pressure for DoD to restrict its purchases to domestic sources
in selected areas. [Ref. 17:pp. 2-3]
DoD has traditionally opposed domestic sourcing requirements except as
a last resort. Domestic sourcing requirements can actually worsen DoD's greatest
concern: access to cutting edge technology for current and future weapon systems.
Most studies indicate that defense acquisition managers typically buy foreign products
for superior performance, superior quality or lower cost. [Ref. 17:pp. 3-5] DoD is
concerned with a reliable supply of low cost, quality products, regardless of their
source.
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In the decade ahead, the U.S. defense industry firms will face increasing
foreign competition. Many argue that the U.S. government should promote U.S.
competitiveness. [Ref. 18:p. 23] The Clinton Administration has affirmed the
importance of DoD's S&T budget to aid U.S. firms, while focusing on dual-use
technologies and demonstrating developments that many believe will contribute to
economic competitiveness. [Ref. 21 :p. 1]
Reconstitution as a main facet of U.S. defense strategy is subject to
question. The three tiers of the DTIB are prime contractors, subcontractors, and
parts suppliers. [Ref. 2:p. 41] Since little is known about the DTTB's lowest tier, the
parts suppliers, future reconstitution efforts could be hindered. DoD does not know
just how dependent U.S. weapon systems are on foreign made components. [Ref.
18:pp. 22-23]
Congress will ultimately make the choice between domestic and foreign
sourcing. This choice involves tradeoffs between national risks and benefits. It is not
easy to balance the risks of relying on other nations for critical defense goods against
the benefits of access to new technology, regardless of its nationality. Using foreign
sources has the side benefit of increasing cooperation with economically strong allies.
Congress, in making these choices, may see autonomy as all important in certain
vanguard technologies and less important in less sophisticated technical areas. [Ref.
2:pp. 15-17] These decisions will shape and determine the DTIB's composition.
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E. PRESERVING THE TECHNOLOGICAL BASE
R&D funding by private firms is expected to decline, since much private sector
defense R&D is linked to defense procurement levels. The reduced demand for
weapon systems will create a production "trough" over the next several years in
certain defense sectors, followed by longer intervals between procurement cycles. As
a result, there may be gaps between the end of several current programs and the
start of next-generation production. [Ref. 2:pp. 3-4]
Decisions about the DTTB made over the next few years will determine
the survival of some U.S. defense firms. In large measure, these decisions will
determine the nation's ability to develop and deploy advanced military systems. [Ref.
10:pp. 6-11] Many believe the U.S. government must decide what R&D and
production capabilities it should attempt to preserve.
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III. DEFENSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BUDGET
A. EXPLANATION
This chapter will compare three successive processes of the S&T budget cycle,
including budget requests, authorizations, and appropriations. Budget authority
within each process will be examined for the period from 1984 to 1994. For each
process of the budget cycle, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a funding will be contrasted to total DoD
and Navy RDT&E.
The first thing Congress needs to know when building a budget is what the
executive branch believes is appropriate to fund the federal government's operations.
The President is required to submit to Congress in early January the Administration's
budget request. Congress considers this budget request and develops the
congressional budget resolution by April 15. The authorization legislation follows,
and it must be passed in order for a program to exist. The authorization establishes
purposes and guidelines for a given activity and usually sets the limit on the amount
that can be spent. However, an authorization does not provide the actual dollars for
a program. An appropriation must be passed to enable an agency to make spending
commitments and obligate dollars. [Ref. 26:pp. C6-C7]
For each budget process, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a accounts will be analyzed separately.
The analysis will include annual increases or decreases to each account, stated as
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percentage changes. Each account will also be expressed as a percent of DoD and
Navy RDT&E funding. Comparing individual accounts against DoD and Navy
RDT&E indicates each account's actual amount relative to overall RDT&E funding.
DoD RDT&E includes all Armed Forces and Defense Agency RDT&E.
Before analysis, all data will be converted to 1994 dollars by using a deflator index
from the Navy Comptroller's Office.
B. PRESIDENTIAL BUDGET REQUESTS
Table I presents inflation-adjusted budget authority as requested by the
President from 1984 until 1994. The amounts presented in Table I will be used for
the 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a budget request analysis. Table I in the appendix presents the
budget request figures, not adjusted for inflation, from 1984 to 1994 for DoD
RDT&E, Navy RDT&E, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a. All of these figures are in thousands of
dollars.
1. Basic Research (6.1) Analysis
Figure 1 compares the requested budget authority for 6.1 to the
requested DoD RDT&E budget authority. The percentage change in 6.1 are
shown for 1985 through 1994. Figures supporting this table can be found in Table
II in the appendix.
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TABLE I
BUDGET SUBMISSIONS (CONSTANT 1994 DOLLARS)
Year DoD RDT&E Navy RDT&E 6.1 6.2 6.3a
1994 38,620,327 9,215,604 433,907 530,119 425,288
1993 39,848,768 8,745,175 486,210 639,152 429,705
1992 42,231,110 8,635,507 444,341 548,570 233,017
1991 41,243,828 9,762,993 434,342 504,910 216,116
1990 44,323,358 11,018,045 437,516 461,009 210,739
1989 44,456,600 10,737,737 415,650 484,547 237,707
1988 53,069,843 12,734,173 462,249 558,564 313,756
1987 52,815,090 13,335,181 489,773 582,211 247,225
1986 51,066,173 14,644,176 483,233 625,931 311,296
1985 45,367,824 13,117,175 467,689 637,867 382,324
1984 40,761,236 11,258,144 446,717 770,036 290,279
Sources: Presidential Budget Submissions for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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Figure 1. 6.1 Comparison to DoD and Navy RDT&E
Sources: Presidential Budget Submissions for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
From 1984 until 1988, 6.1 generally represented a declining share of the
DoD and Navy RDT&E budget request. DoD RDT&E emphasis during that period
centered on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and nuclear missiles. Funds for
DoD RDT&E expenditures peaked in 1988. After 1988, budget requests for 6.1
represented a larger share of DoD and Navy RDT&E. Basic Research funding grew
slightly until 1994, while DoD and Navy RDT&E was decreasing. Through 1993,
investment in basic research constituted a growing share of DoD and Navy RDT&E
to provide a hedge against technological surprise.
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In 1993, basic research investment continued to grow even as DoD
RDT&E broadened its investment strategy to include both mission support
requirements and areas that have potentially broad private sector applications.
According to the 1993 presidential budget submission, government's role is to support
generic or enabling technology at the pre-competitive basic research level.
President Clinton's 1994 budget submission asserted that government's
role was to invest in dual-use areas where the returns are too far away or the initial
investment is too high to attract private sector investment. Despite a nearly 11
percent decline in 6.1 funding levels, the budget request asserted its support for basic
research funding with competitive commercial relevance.
2. Exploratory Development (6.2) Analysis
Figure 2 compares the requested budget authority for 6.2 to requested
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Figure 2. 6.2 Comparison to DoD and Navy RDT&E
Sources: Presidential Budget Submissions for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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from 1985 to 1994. Figures supporting this chart can be found in Table III in the
appendix.
Following the 6.1 budget request trend, budget requests for 6.2 funding as part
of DoD and Navy RDT&E generally decreased from 1984 to 1989, with large
decreases in 1985 and 1989. DoD RDT&E budgets steadily increased in real terms
through 1988, partly in response to increased research funding for SDI (refer to
Table I in this chapter).
From 1984 until 1990, 6.2 experienced a stunning 59 percent drop in
funding based on budget requests. By 1993, annual budget requests for 6.2 rose 38
percent compared to 1990 levels. The Bush Administration emphasized technology
development efforts and pre-competitive technology later in its term. This helps
explain the increase. The 1993 budget request stated that the goal of R&D is to
generate new knowledge, train future workers, and act as a catalyst for economic
activity. The rate of increase for 6.2 during this period was higher than that of 6.1.
The 1994 budget submission included a 21 percent drop in funding for 6.2.
All Navy S&T accounts experienced reductions in the 1994 budget request, with the
6.2 rate of reduction being 50 percent higher than the rate for 6.1. Projections
indicate a zero growth mode for S&T through the year 2000.
3. Advanced Technology Development (6.3a) Analysis
Figure 3 compares the requested budget authority for 6.3a to requested
DoD and Navy RDT&E budget authority. The percentage change for 6.3a is
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Figure 3. 6.3a Comparison to DoD and Navy RDT&E
Sources: Presidential Budget Submissions for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
Between 1984 and 1990, the 6.3a budget request declined 27 percent.
Unlike funding requested for 6.1 and 6.2, 6.3a did not exhibit a steady decline.
Funding swings of approximately 20 percent occurred from year to year. Perhaps
6.3a's volatility can be attributed to its very nature. Items funded by 6.3a represent
technology further along in development and closer to actual production. Therefore,
it can be more susceptible to changes attributable to production decisions.
Funding requests for 1991 and 1992 increased slightly. The 1993 budget
request soared by 46 percent, reflecting the Bush Administration's emphasis on
demonstrating the potential of combining different technologies or components.
Interest also increased in efforts that support DoD mission requirements and have
possible civilian sector applications.
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The 1994 budget request remained roughly flat at 1993 levels. Sustained
funding for 6.3a is compatible with the Clinton Administration's industrial policy.
That policy includes strong support for basic research aimed at projects with a pre-
competitive commercial relevance.
4. Budget Request Process Summation
The 6.3a account was more volatile than 6.1 and 6.2 for the 1984 through
1994 period. The most noteworthy trend occurred during the Bush administration.
In general, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a each accounted for a larger percentage of DoD and
Navy RDT&E between 1990 and 1993. It is important to note that the high point
for DoD and Navy RDT&E budget requests came in 1986. In spite of decreases in
DoD and Navy RDT&E budget requests from 1989 to 1994, S&T accounted for a
larger share. This reflected, in part, the decline in funding for SDI and nuclear
deterrence. The fact that S&T accounts were growing in relation to DoD and Navy
RDT&E budget requests points to the more prominent role S&T played during the
Bush Presidency.
In 1994, the first Clinton DoD budget request decreased all S&T funding
requests in absolute terms and as shares of both DoD and Navy RDT&E. This may
reflect the Clinton administration's emphasis on civilian application research.
C. BUDGET AUTHORIZATIONS
Table II presents the inflation-adjusted budget data as authorized by Congress
from 1984 until 1994. The amounts presented in Table II will be used for 6.1, 6.2,
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and 6.3a authorization analysis. Table V in the appendix presents the nominal
authorization figures from 1984 to 1994 for DoD RDT&E, Navy RDT&E, 6.1, 6.2,
and 6.3a. Figures in Table II are in thousands of dollars.
TABLE II
BUDGET AUTHORIZATION (CONSTANT 1994 DOLLARS)
Year DoD RDT&E Navy RDT&E 6.1 6.2 6.3a
1994 37,885,398 8,736,970 445,407 562,019
419,527
1993 40,671,047 9,224,555 440,009 570,397 362,689
1992 42,213,721 9,098,825 432,361 574,668 244,992
1991 39,081,745 10,196,984 434,342 542,805 255,094
1990 42,845,774 11,365,613 461,687 589,690 242,888
1989 44,238,844 10,932,308 415,650 485,712 239,455
1988 49,176,044 12,074,716 420,283 488,653 313,676
1987 45,617,332 11,706,898 477,676 549,274 197,582
1986 46,137,226 13,138,847 483,233 609,896 279,268
1985 42,825,074 12,559,867 466,855 604,289 261,579
1984 37,565,916 10,483,502 446,717 620,208 264,902
Sources: Congressional Budget Authorizations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
1. Basic Research (6.1) Analysis
Figure 4 shows the percentage change for 6.1 for 1985 to 1994. It also
compares the authorization for 6.1 to DoD and Navy RDT&E authorizations.
Figures supporting this chart can be found in Table VI in the appendix.
26
Congressional authorizations for 6.1 as a share of DoD and Navy RDT&E
generally declined from 1984 through 1988 and increased thereafter. Authorized
funding for 6.1 increased by 18 percent between 1984 and 1986, though at a
decreasing rate, while DoD RDT&E funding increased by 22 percent and Navy
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Figure 4. 6.1 Comparison to DoD and Navy RdT&E
Sources: Congressional Budget Authorizations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
1989, 6.1 funding decreased by 13 percent while DoD and Navy RDT&E generally
declined until 1994. SDI funding reductions began in 1989. After an 11 percent
increase in 1990 and a slight decrease of 6 percent in 1991, 6.1 authorizations held
roughly constant for the next three years. During the 1989 to 1994 period, 6.1
generally increased its share of DoD and Navy RDT&E.
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In 1990, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) chastised the
military for a lack clarity in S&T priorities. The committee derided DoD for not
having a long term plan and for divergent goals among the branches of the armed
forces. The SASC also noted that the DTIB requires the highest priority, particularly
because it is closely intertwined with the civilian industrial base. By 1991, the House
Armed Services Committee (HASC) wanted DoD to help ensure a vigorous and
modern technology pool. Over the next three years, 6.1 authorizations remained
roughly constant as Congress recognized the importance of basic technological
research.
2. Exploratory Development (6.2) Analysis
Figure 5 compares the authorization for 6.2 to DoD and Navy RDT&E
authorizations. The percentage change for 6.2 is shown for 1985 to 1994. Figures
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Sources: Congressional Budget Authorizations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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Authorizations for 6.2 generally declined between 1985 and 1989. As a
share of DoD and Navy RDT&E, authorizations for 6.2 bottomed out in 1989. After
1988, the general rate of decrease in DoD and Navy RDT&E funding exceeded that
for 6.2. Congress recognized the declines for 6.2 and authorized a 18 percent
increase in 1990. Both Congressional chambers stated that our national security
relies on superior technology.
Between 1990 and 1994, 6.2 authorizations declined 5 percent. During the
same five year period, funding for DoD RDT&E declined 12 percent and Navy
RDT&E plummeted 23 percent. Despite a downward trend for defense related
RDT&E, 6.2 authorizations declined at a more moderate rate. The HASC stated
that it was aware of past downward trends in 6.1 and 6.2 funding and would redirect
efforts to emphasize technology base funding. Congress clearly recognized that, to
meet its military needs, U.S. critical technology efforts must be supported. By 1994,
6.2 authorizations reached their highest funding level relative to Navy RDT&E over
the ten years of data analyzed.
3. Advanced Technology Development (6.3a) Analysis
Figure 6 compares the authorization for 6.3a to DoD and Navy RDT&E
authorizations. The percentage change for 6.3a is shown for 1985 to 1994. Figures
supporting this chart can be found in Table VIII in the appendix.
Between 1984 and 1994 6.3a authorizations showed an impressive 37
percent increase. 6.3a authorizations did not rise at a uniform rate during the period.
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Figure 6. 6.3a Comparison to DoD and Navy RDT&E
Sources: Congressional Budget Authorizations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
between 1984 and 1987. By 1988, 6.3a authorizations began to increase, though there
were decreases in 1989 and 1992.
By 1987, 6.3a authorization reached their lowest level as a share of DoD
and Navy RDT&E. After a relatively large increase in 1988 and a modest increase
1989, 6.3a increased slowly as a share of DoD and Navy RDT&E authorizations until
1987. The increases authorized for 1993 and 1994 were much higher. The increases
in 1993 and 1994 reflect the emphasis Congress placed on advanced technology
efforts. In 1993, the HASC requested DoD to provide an annual status report of
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critical sectors, worker skills, technologies, processes, the DTIB and DoD actions to
address any shortcomings.
4. Authorization Summation
The most volatile account in the authorization process was 6.3a. 6.3a was
also the most volatile account in the budget request process, but the authorization
funding swings were more pronounced than the budget request swings. Using
inflation adjusted figures, 1989 represented the low point for 6.1 and 6.2
authorizations. In 1989, 6.3a was at its second lowest point for the authorization
process. The actual low point for 6.3a authorizations was in 1987. Budget requests
for 6.1 were at a low in 1989 and for 6.2 and 6.3a in 1990. This suggests that the
authorization process had an impact on the upcoming budget request for S&T during
the Bush administration.
S&T authorizations constituted a growing share of Navy RDT&E
authorizations after 1988 for 6.1 and 6.2 and after 1989 for 6.3a. From 1989 through
1994, S&T authorizations also increased as a share of DoD RDT&E authorizations.
This trend of S&T authorizations preceded a similar trend for S&T budget requests.
This authorization trend preceded the budget request trend by two years for 6.1 and
6.2 and one year for 6.3a. Again, this trend points to a heightened emphasis on S&T
during the post-Reagan years.
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D. BUDGET APPROPRIATION
Table III presents inflation adjusted budget appropriations as approved by
Congress from 1984 until 1994. The amounts presented in Table III will be used for
6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a appropriation analysis. Table VIII in the appendix presents the
nominal appropriations figures from 1984 to 1994 for DoD RDT&E, Navy RDT&E,
6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a.
1. Basic Research (6.1) Analysis
Figure 7 compares the appropriation for 6.1 to DoD and Navy RDT&E
appropriations. The percentage change for 6.1 is shown for 1985 to 1994. Figures
supporting this chart can be found in Table IX in the appendix.
Appropriations for 6.1 rose in 1985 and 1986, before gradually declining
through 1989. From 1990 until 1993, 6.1 appropriations increased by 14 percent.
The 1994 appropriations declined by 9 percent, despite the new administration's focus
on S&T and civilian technology.
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TABLE HI
BUDGET APPROPRIATIONS (CONSTANT 1994 DOLLARS)
Year DoD RDT&E Navy RDT&E 6.1 6.2 6.3a
1994 34,946,384 8,365,786 417,407 468,606 437,354
1993 38,975,522 9,168,769 459,196 629,271 443,592
1992 41,286,169 9,018,479 428,672 535,658 243,154
1991 38,676,994 9,785,279 428,435 545,116 245,837
1990 41,421,398 10,954,017 410,308 343,564 195,363
1989 43,624,296 10,931,273 403,999 519,456 219,444
1988 44,689,219 11,575,163 415,169 495,206 275,307
1987 45,099,149 11,747,595 460,597 541,287 166,358
1986 45,940,594 13,085,334 475,475 606,037 248,420
1985 41,632,721 12,244,856 457,480 591,630 295,657
1984 36,722,990 10,401,511 446,717 620,208 236,004
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Figure 7. 6.1 Share of DoD and Navy RDT&E
Sources: Congressional Budget Appropriations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
Navy 6.1 appropriations as a share of DoD and Navy RDT&E appropria-
tions generally showed a small decline from 1984 to 1989. From 1990 through 1994,
6.1 appropriations increased as a share of DoD and Navy RDT&E appropriations.
The share of 6.1 appropriations increased in 1994, even though appropriations for 6.1
decreased. This shows the dramatic decline in overall DoD and Navy RDT&E
appropriation levels.
Until 1987, growth in DoD R&D was primarily directed at imperatives for
SDI, communications, and space activities. In 1985 the SASC, stated its concern over
the share of RDT&E consumed by SDI. The HASC voiced a similar concern about
SDI's and nuclear deterrence development's impact on university research funding
in 1987. The HASC also stated the importance of university research programs to
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national security. In the following years, Congressional scrutiny focused on program
coordination, prioritization, and cost effectiveness. Congress also stressed the
importance of the DTIB.
2. Exploratory Development (6.2) Analysis
Figure 8 compares the appropriation for 6.2 to DoD and Navy RDT&E
appropriations. The percentage change for 6.2 is shown for 1985 to 1994. Figures
supporting this chart can be found in Table X in the appendix.
No clear yearly trend exists for 6.2 appropriations. In real terms, 6.2
appropriations in 1993 were at roughly the same level as in 1984. Taken on a yearly
basis, 6.2 levels varied widely over the entire period. The largest reduction in 6.2
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Figure 8. 6.2 Comparison to DoD and Navy RDT&E
Sources: Congressional Budget Appropriations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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6.2 appropriation by 45 percent from 1984 levels. The next largest reduction
occurred in 1994, as Congress attempted to consolidate research across services,
eliminate unnecessary duplication, and increase cost effectiveness.
Between 1984 and 1990, 6.2 appropriations declined by nearly 50 percent
as a share of DoD and Navy RDT&E appropriations. 1993 saw 6.2 appropriations
increase as a share of overall RDT&E, in part because overall RDT&E fell. In 1994,
6.2 appropriations declined as a share of DoD RDT&E to a 1992 level and as a
share of Navy RDT&E to a 1991 level.
3. Advanced Technology Development (6.3a) Analysis
Figure 9 compares the appropriation for 6.3a to DoD and Navy RDT&E
appropriations. The percentage change for 6.3a is shown for 1985 to 1994. Figures
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Sources: Congressional Budget Appropriations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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By 1994, 6.3a appropriations increased 85 percent in real terms from 1984
levels. 6.3a appropriations fluctuated yearly with a maximum increase of 45 percent
and a maximum decrease of 33 percent. No general or steady trends can be
discerned. The 1993 increase in 6.3a involved funding for littoral warfare research.
The most significant change in 6.3a occurred during the 1992 to 1994
period. Appropriations for DoD and Navy RDT&E funding declined by over 15
percent and 7 percent respectively, while 6.3a appropriations increased by 8 percent.
The increase came in spite of a HASC statement that S&T programs have become
too costly. From 1984 to 1990, 6.3a appropriations varied widely. Overall 1990
appropriations decreased slightly when compared to 1984. DoD and Navy RDT&E
funding reached a peak in 1986. They then declined to approximately 1984 levels by
1990.
E. APPROPRIATION SUMMATION
Appropriations were lowest for the 1984 through 1994 period in 1989 for 6.1
and 1990 for 6.2 and 6.3a. These S&T accounts grew until 1993. Starting in 1989
for 6.1 and 1990 for 6.2 and 6.3a, S&T appropriations increased as a share of DoD
and Navy RDT&E, with the exception of 6.1 in 1992. In 1994, the first Clinton
budget, appropriations for these Navy S&T accounts declined in real terms.
However, with the exception of 6.2, S&T continued to increase as a share of DoD
and Navy RDT&E.
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Appropriations for DoD and Navy RDT&E peaked in 1986 and continuously
declined through 1994. Budget requests and authorizations for DoD and Navy
RDT&E peaked in 1988. S&T appropriations decreased at a faster rate than DoD
RDT&E until 1989 for 6.1 and 6.2.
This data clearly shows a marked difference in S&T funding between the
Reagan and Bush periods. During the Reagan period, a greater emphasis was placed
on non-S&T RDT&E. This philosophical change in funding priorities for RDT&E
funding is evidenced by the increase in Navy S&T relative to DoD and Navy
RDT&E during the Bush period. In a time of declining DoD budgets, S&T held its
own and did increasingly well.
Generally, appropriations constituted a growing share of Navy RDT&E, similar
to the authorization trend, after 1988 for 6.1 and 6.2 and after 1989 for 6.3a. The
exceptions to this trend were in 1994 for 6.1 and in 1990 and 1994 for 6.2. With the
exception of decreases in 1992 for 6.2 and 6.3a as a share of DoD RDT&E, S&T
funding constituted a larger share of DoD RDT&E after 1989. Again, this trend
follows the pattern of authorizations over the same period. These trends point to a
growing emphasis on S&T during the Bush years.
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IV. THE NATURE OF CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION IN S&T
The previous chapter examined the funding trends within each part of the
budget process. This chapter will examine the nature and scope of the changes made
to the budget request by Congress. Basic Research, Exploratory Development, and
Advanced Technology Development will be independently analyzed to determine the
extent of the intervention. After that analysis, the concept of technology transfer will
be explained, and then the Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program and
the Navy Dual-Use Technology programs. These two programs represent a
constraint upon the Navy's RDT&E budget. Finally, the Advanced Concepts and
Technology Demonstrations (ACDT) will be discussed.
A. BUDGET PROCESS ANALYSIS
In this section, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a will be examined separately to determine the
annual changes. Figures will be used to examine 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a funding from 1984
to 1994. For this section, the president's budget request is the baseline. Comparing
the authorization and appropriation figures to the budget request indicates the
degree of Congressional intervention. Data presented in each chart are in thousands
of 1994 dollars and complete data for each chart is in the appendix.
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Recall that the budget request sets forth the president's financial plan and
indicates his priorities for the federal government. The budget request formulation
process reflects the continual exchange of information, proposals, evaluations, and
policy decisions among the President, his staff, the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), and various government departments or agencies. Decisions regarding the
upcoming budget are influenced by the results of previously enacted budgets,
reactions to the last budget, and what is being considered by Congress. This budget
formulation process also considers the resource needs of individual programs, and
total outlays and receipts relative to current and projected economic conditions.
[Ref. 26:pp. 5 and 4]
After the president's budget is submitted and reviewed by Congress, the
legislature can then act to approve, modify, or disapprove the president's budget.
However, virtually all congressional budget activities that take place throughout the
rest of the process will use the President's budget as a starting point. Budget
committees hold hearings to consider the whole budget, while Authorization and
Appropriation committees hold hearings on specific parts of the budget within their
legislative jurisdiction. The Congressional Budget Resolution is the Congress' budget
and does not require executive approval. [Ref. 26:p. 6]
For a program to exist, an authorization must be passed. An authorization
establishes the purposes and guidelines and, usually, sets ceilings on the amount that
can be spent. The authorization does not provide actual funding. An appropriation
must be passed so that a federal government agency can commit and obligate funds.
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The appropriation for a program normally does not exceed the authorization ceiling.
[Ref. 26:p. 6]
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Figure 10. Basic Research Analysis
Sources: Presidential Budget Submissions for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
Congressional Budget Authorizations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
Congressional Budget Appropriations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
Figure 10 compares the annual inflation-adjusted 6.1 budget requests,
authorizations, and appropriations. Table XIII in the appendix presents a complete
listing of all figures used in Figure 10.
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From 1984 to 1986, all parties in the budget processes generally agreed
on increased 6.1 funding, with each of the budget processes following its traditional
role. In 1987 and 1988, budget requests were a weaker indication of funding
authorizations and appropriations. Both authorizations and appropriations were
significantly lower than the budget request during a period of declining funding. By
1989, the budget request did not differ from the authorization and was within 3
percent of the appropriation.
From 1990 through 1994, there was greater volatility in the budget
processes. The budget process adhered less to the traditional roles. For example,
the 1990 authorization was much larger than the budget request and appropriation
and the 1993 authorization was less than the appropriation. During this period, the
budget request was a poor indicator of the final appropriation.
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Figure 11. Exploratory Development Analysis
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Sources: Presidential Budget Submissions for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
Congressional Budget Authorizations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
Congressional Budget Appropriations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
Figure 11 compares annual inflation-adjusted 6.2 budget requests,
authorizations, and appropriations. Table XTV in the appendix presents a complete
listing of all amounts in Figure 11.
Two trends are apparent when comparing 6.2 budget submissions,
authorizations, and appropriations between 1984 and 1988. First, budget requests,
authorizations, and appropriations all steadily decreased through 1988, with
authorizations being smaller than budget requests. Second, appropriations were
within 2 percent of authorizations. From 1989 through 1994, there was greater
degree of volatility among the budget processes. Authorizations exceeded the budget
request in 1990 and 1994 and were less than the budget request and appropriation
in 1993.
In 1989, the 6.2 budget request decreased 13 percent from the 1988
budget request. Again, that appears to mark the point when budget request levels
dropped to or below anticipated authorization levels. In 1989 and 1991, 6.2
appropriations were larger than budget requests and authorizations. In both years,
Congress expressed concern regarding technological surprises. [Ref. 30:p. 504 and
Ref. 31:p. 482]
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In 1990, efforts to consolidate programs or to drop programs lacking a
firm direction gained steam, particularly in the appropriations committee. The 1990
authorization was 25 percent larger than the budget request. However, the
appropriation was less than 60 percent of the authorization. Thus, the final
appropriation was more than 25 percent less than the budget request.
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Figure 12. Advanced Technology Development Analysis
Sources: Presidential Budget Submissions for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
Congressional Budget Authorizations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
Congressional Budget Appropriations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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Figure 12 compares annual inflation-adjusted 6.3a budget requests,
authorizations, and appropriations. Table XV in the appendix presents a complete
listing of all amounts in Figure 12.
As with 6.1 and 6.2, the 1984 to 1988 period had less change for 6.3a
between each budget process than did the 1989 through 1994 period. Generally,
from 1984 to 1988, authorizations were less than the budget request and
appropriations were less than the appropriation. Authorizations reduced the budget
request in each year through 1988. After 1988, the authorization committee provided
higher funding levels than requested until 1993.
After 1988, the process demonstrated a greater volatility. During this
period, budget requests were a poor indicator of the final appropriation. These
budget requests were even worse indicators than for 6.1 and 6.2. After 1988,
authorizations were lower than budget requests in only two years and appropriations
were larger than the budget request and authorization in 1993 and 1994.
4. Budget Process Summation
The trends noted in Chapter III become more apparent in this budget
process analysis. From 1985 through 1989 for 6.1 and 1990 for 6.2 and 6.3a, S&T
budget requests, authorizations, and appropriations generally declined. Navy 6.2 and
6.3a funding trends were consistently downward. 6.1 funding increased through 1987
before declining to its low point in 1989.
All S&T budget categories increased funding from 1989 for 6.1 and 1990
for 6.2 and 6.3a through 1993. S&T experienced greater support during the Bush
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presidency. This trend reinforces the trend noted in Chapter III. The 1994 Clinton
budget appears to have halted this trend. In 1994, the budget declined for 6.1 and
6.2 and held roughly constant for 6.3a.
No significant difference was noted between participants in the budget
processes for 6.1. The changes to the budget requested by Congress were greater for
6.2 and even greater for 6.3a funding. This increased volatility for 6.3a was noted in
Chapter Ill's analysis of the 6.3a account.
Generally, the period from 1985 to 1989 for Navy S&T showed a budget
request that is larger than authorizations and appropriations. There is only one
instance, 6.3a in 1985, where appropriations exceeded authorizations. The 1990 to
1994 period does show a greater degree of volatility between the budget request,
authorization, and appropriation.
Specifically, 1990 stands out. For all S&T categories, the authorization
exceeded the request which exceeded the appropriation. The 1990 Bush S&T budget
focus was to invest in new technology and guard against technological surprise. The
Navy Basic Research budget increased 5 percent while the budget for Exploratory
Development and Advanced Technology Development declined by 5 percent and 11
percent respectively. [Ref. 34:pp. 163 1-1632]
The SASC, in its report on the president's budget, noted that DoD S&T
lacked clear priorities, adequate funding, and conformity of goals. The DTIB had
the highest priority and there was a perception that the defense and civilian industrial
bases were becoming less distinguishable and that the president's budget did not
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adequately support the industrial base. [Ref. 35:pp. 17-18] The appropriators, as
stated in the Conference Report on the Defense Budget, saw a DoD RDT&E budget
with excessive waste and duplication. They even stated that some programs had
limited military applicability. [Ref 36:p. 102]
In the next section, two types of technology transfers will be analyzed.
SBIR and Dual-Use Technology Development are technology transfers that are
funded by S&T. The congressional mandates of these programs constitute a growing
constraint on Navy S&T.
B. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
The concept of technology transfer from the military sector to the commercial
sector has been discussed at great length. There is a belief that defense research
funding can be spent more productively. "More productively" means that these
dollars can be used to meet defense requirements, but also to have some applications
for the commercial sector.
There are three types or definitions of technology transfer involving DoD: spin-
off, spin-on, and dual-use technology. Traditionally, technology transfer was viewed
as a one-way process, moving technology developed in federal programs to
commercial applications. This is known as a "spin-off." [Ref. 27:p. 29] Technology
development in this instance is not sensitive to market forces in the commercial
sector. In the past, DoD assumed that defense technologies would simply spin-off
into commercial applications, more or less on their own.
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"Spin-on" technology holds that the best commercial technology can be adopted
for military uses. Frequently this technology must be adapted. Spin-on conflicts with
the traditional DoD practice of developing technology in-house. Militarily adapted
commercial technology requires the military to alter existing technology for its needs.
This may reduce performance as a tradeoff for enhancing economic competitiveness.
[Ref. 27:p. 29] The current military procurement system prefers developing new
systems rather than purchasing existing weapon systems. Modifying this system
should facilitate adapting commercially developed products.
Dual-use technology development is another form of technology transfer. Dual-
use technology development takes advantage of the collaborative pull of the defense
and commercial market places to develop needed technology. Dual-use technologies
have military and civilian applications. Wherever possible, DoD is emphasizing
technology that is dual-use rather than military-unique. This represents a clear break
from the past, when making the fruits of military research available to the public was
not a high priority. Designing technology with two purposes, military and civilian,
places DoD in an awkward position where it must weigh a technology's military
potential against the benefits its procurement may have on the nation's economy.
[Ref 28:p. 91]
Some experts believe that the best modes for technology transfer are spin-on
and dual-use. Two programs representing each of these two types of technology
transfers are examined below. Each program, in essence, places a constraint upon
the military's research procurement options.
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1. Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR)
The Small Business Innovative Development Act of 1982 sought to
encourage technology innovation primarily by requiring federal agencies to award
portions of their research funds to small businesses though special SBIR programs.
The act was a result of congressional interest in scientific innovation and the nation's
economic growth. The premise of the act is that small businesses have become a
significant source of technological innovation. The act attempted to increase small
business participation in federal research and development. [Ref 29:p. 1] SBIR is
a spin-on type of technology transfer.
All major federal research agencies, DoD included, are required to set up
special SBIR programs. The law mandates that these federal agencies devote a
proportion (at least 1.25 percent) of external research dollars to this program. [Ref
30: pp. 64-65] The Small Business Administration (SBA) monitors compliance with
the act. The SBA has defined a small business as a for-profit firm with fewer than
500 employees. [Ref 29:p.l]
Proponents of the Small Business Innovative Development Act of 1982
argued that federal R&D procurement systems favored large firms and universities.
SBIR funding guarantees that the small business sector receives an appropriate share
of federal R&D funding. Opponents of this act questioned whether other means of
increasing small business research participation might be more appropriate. Also,
this mandatory funding constraint would put pressure on already tight federal agency
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R&D budgets, thereby causing the services to procure less desirable research. [Ref
29:pp. 1-4]
SBIR contracts are considered useful for a number of reasons. The SBIR
program supports innovative technologies being developed by small business. This
act clearly offers opportunities to "spin-on" commercial technology from small
business innovations. This is an increasingly popular method to focus resources on
pre-competitive technology. [Ref. 27:p. 34] These programs offer potential cost
minimization for technology development and speed technology transfer that enhance
U.S. economic competitiveness.
The Navy SBIR program element, as shown in the DoD RDT&E
Programs (R-l) for fiscal year 1994, included an entry for SBIR in fiscal years 1993
and 1994. Under Secretary Aspin, DoD has more actively supported these
technology transfer programs. The Navy SBIR program element, as shown in the
1994 R-l, receives its funding from 6.1 or Basic Research. In 1993 SBIR funding was
$81,443,000. That amounted to 7.5 percent of Navy 6.1 funding and 0.912 percent
of Navy RDT&E funding. For 1994, SBIR was allocated $86,113,000. That is a 5.7
percent increase over 1993 funding. SBIR funding consumed 8.9 percent of Navy
6.1 and 0.934 percent of Navy RDT&E. The SBIR program funding has accounted
for a greater share of available Naval research funding. [Ref. 3:p. N-l]
2. Navy Dual-Use Technology Programs
The Navy Dual-Use Technology program is an extension of the 1992
Defense Conversion, Reinvestment, and Transition Act. This act is implemented by
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means of the Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) to be administered by the
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). This act reflected the Congress' desire
to pull down barriers to effective technologies transferred between the public and
private sectors. It is intended that TRP will "demonstratably" enhance U.S. economic
competitiveness. [Ref. 27:pp. 16-17]
The purpose of this new program is to develop dual-use technologies that
will enhance the economic viability and competitiveness of U.S. industry in
technological areas of particular relevance to the Navy. This is a form of dual-use
technology transfer that will be funded for the first time in the 1995 budget.
According to the FY 1995 Navy Descriptive Summary for RDT&E, the proposed
fiscal year 1995 funding for this program is $50,000,000 for 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a. This
program emphasizes technology creation, fostering technology transfer and enhancing
the U.S. Defense Technology Industrial Base. This is the primary Navy program for
developing new technology in areas of critical Navy interest.
3. Summation
Currently, SBIR is over 50 percent larger than Dual-Use Technology
programs. A greater share of funding was allocated to SBIR in 1994 than in 1993.
This occurred despite a S&T funding decline in 1994. A greater share of S&T
funding went to SBIR as 6.1 declined. The Navy has lost some degree of control
over nearly 9 percent of its Basic Research budget.
The Navy Dual-Use Technology program is new and only the President's
FY 1995 budget figures are available. This program, like SBIR, is a constraint on
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S&T research procurement options. It mandates that the Navy focus less on
procurement of military specific items and more on economic vitality of a certain
segment of the civilian sector.
C. ADVANCED CONCEPTS AND TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS (ACDT)
ACDT is considered the first change in weapon system procurement under
President Clinton. Since this is the first change to DoD RDT&E by President
Clinton, it could represent one future direction of DoD RDT&E. The goal ofACDT
is to fund prototypes or demonstrations for 20 to 40 technology projects judged
critical for developing weapons. Prototypes are funded through the 6.3a and 6.3b
accounts. ACDT will not replace the current DoD procurement system. This effort
will affect Advanced Technology Development and Advanced Development. This
will be an additional phase of the acquisition process. This is an integrating effort
involving very substantial cooperation and participation of those who use and who
develop technology. By refining operational requirements and concept designs, the
new systems can be developed with minimal cost or delay. [Ref. 33:p.3]
DoD currently has 150 demonstrations competing for funding. To change this
situation, the ACDT program will reduce the number of demonstrations and use the
saving to pay for the ACDT program. This program is also designed to provide work
for defense firms facing reduced funding due to decreased weapon system
procurement.
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V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ADVANCED PROTOTYPES
A. ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
Advanced Technology Development (6.3a) focuses on demonstrating how
components of a system work together; it is the most mature S&T stage. This
chapter will examine the implication of Advanced Technology Demonstration
(ATDs) and Enhanced Technology Demonstrations (ETDs) on the 6.3a account.
ATDs and ETDs represent an effort to take advantage of high technology
demonstrations and refine the prototyping process. These advanced or enhanced
technology demonstrations have the potential to help maintain the industrial base.
Budget figures used for all analyses are inflation adjusted and utilize 1994 as the base
year for comparison. A complete listing of all figures for all three charts in this
chapter can be found in the appendix.
B. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT IN ACQUISITION
In April of 1992, while still the Chairman of the House Armed Service
Committee, Mr. Aspin outlined a technology development strategy that offered the
flexibility that the U.S. would require to deal with threats in the post-Cold War, post-
Soviet world. The strategy involved four approaches for maintaining critical areas
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of the DTIB. The four approaches are selective upgrading, selective low-rate
procurements, silver bullet procurements, and rollover plus.
The first two approaches aim at sustaining a minimum production capability in
defense-unique industries. Selective upgrading would improve weaponry without the
expense of new systems. Selective low-rate procurements would purchase current-
generation systems and components as needed. Silver bullet procurements involve
systems that leverage the U.S. high technology advantage. The F-117's success during
Operation Desert Storm illustrates the value of silver bullets. Rollover plus is a
continuous process of systems protoyping and development, without a commitment
up front to production. Basically, it involves "rolling" over technology from one
development cycle to another until the technology is required in the field or some
narrow production criteria are met. [Ref. 23:pp. 1-4] Rollover Plus uses prototypes
to demonstrate a potentially important or high pay-off technology. Mr. Aspin clearly
understood the importance of prototyping for military and civilian sectors.
In 1992, Mr. William Perry, Co-Director of the Stanford Center for Inter-
national Security and Arms Control, testified before the HASC that technology
demonstration to test new ideas is critical to determining which technology should
enter production. After identifying a new high-leverage technology that will provide
a definitive military advantage, the U.S. should build a demonstration system and test
the concept. [Ref. 27:p. 358]
The 6.3a account is designed to focus on identifying new ideas with high
defense payoff potential. 6.3a can be thought of as the "show me" phase of the DoD
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S&T program. Technology demonstrations are not something new. Stealth
technology and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack System (JSTARS) are two
examples of technology demonstrations yielding a weapon system.
Even as DoD's budget for new systems is cut back, DoD's need to maintain
technological superiority is as important as ever. Technology is a force multiplier
and certainly helps minimize U.S. casualties. Operation Desert Storm showed how
technology can save lives. Even though the defense budget has decreased, funding
for ATDs and ETDs has increased. Both ATD and ETD program elements are
funded through the 6.3a account. The ATD program includes the Generic Logistics
R&D Technology Transition and the Marine Corps ATD. The ETD program
includes the Undersea Warfare ATD and Global Surveillance/Air Defense/Precision
Strike Technology Demonstrations.
ATDs and ETDs are increasing in scope, depth and importance. In funding
current and future ATDs and ETDs, DoD must concentrate on proving the maturity
and utility of a broad range of technology. ATDs and ETDs are designed to prove
the feasibility and producibility of a technological concept and to reduce risk in the
system acquisition process. The focus is on technology and not on a total operational
system. Technology demonstrations reduce risk by helping to determine which
technology can pay off. They also provide technology options that hedge against
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Figure 13. ATD Funding Analysis
Sources: RDT&E Programs (R-l) Department of Defense Budget for 1990 to
1994.
Figure 13 shows the annual change between 1991 and 1994 in overall 6.3a and
ATD funding, and in the two ATD components, Generic Logistics R&D Technology
Demonstrations (R&D DEMOS) and Marine Corps ATD (MC ATD). Figure 13
shows that the R&D DEMOS series grew at a slower rate than ATD in all years but
1993. MC ATD funding has the opposite trend. The MC ATD budget has increased
since its inception in 1992, rising 54 percent in 1993 and 38 percent in 1994. As such,
it has grown at least as fast as ATD funding from 1991 to 1994. Funding for ATD
and R&D DEMOS declined in 1994, while MC ATD continued to increase. Figures
used in Figure 13 can be found in the appendix in Tables XVI and XVII.
ATD funding as a share of 6.3a funding increased from 9 percent to 14 percent
in 1992. Then it declined slightly to 13 percent by 1994. Even though Marine Corps
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ATD funding was increasing in 1993 and 1994, it was not enough to offset the decline
in Generic Logistics R&D DEMOS. The R&D Technology Demonstration program
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Figure 14. ETD Funding Analysis
Sources: RDT&E Programs (R-l) Department of Defense Budget for 1990 to
1994.
Figure 14 shows the annual change between 1991 and 1994 in overall 6.3a and
ETD funding, and in the two ETD components, Advanced Anti-Submarine Warfare
(ASW) Technology Demonstrations (ASLO) and Global Surveillance/Air
Defense/Precision Strike Technology Demonstrations (TECH DEMO). Funding for
TECH DEMOs began in 1993. Advanced ASW Technology Demonstrations were
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funded in all years of this analysis. ASLO increased by nearly 205 percent in 1992
after a decrease of over 57 percent in 1991. Funding for ASW Technology
Demonstrators increased further in 1993 but declined by 36 percent in 1994. The
Global Surveillance/Air Defense/Precision Strike Technology Demonstrations
program element increased each year it was funded, with 1994 funding increasing by
over 400 percent. Figures used in Figure 14 can be found in the appendix in Tables
XVIII and XIX.
ETD funding as a share of 6.3a increased in each year but 1993. ETD funding
as a share of 6.3a would have decline in 1994 if it were not for the dramatic increase
in funding for Global Surveillance/Air Defense/Precision Strike Technology
Demonstrations.
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Figure 15. ATD & ETD Funding Analysis
Sources: RDT&E Programs (R-l) Department of Defense Budget for 1990 to
1994.
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The ATD & ETD change series in Figure 15 shows that ATD and ETD
Technology Demonstrations funding increased dramatically in 1992 after a decline
in 1991. Funding increases were successively smaller in 1993 and 1994. The 6.3a
change series in Figure 15 shows 6.3a funding increasing in 1992 and 1993. In 1991
and 1994, 6.3a funding declined.
By 1992, ATD and ETD funding as a share of 6.3a was over 35 percent, shown
by the share of 6.3a series in Figure 15. In 1993, ATD and ETD funding grew by 62
percent while 6.3a funding grew by 95 percent. Despite the relatively large increase
in overall 6.3a funding, the ATD and ETD funding accounted for more than 30
percent of 6.3a in 1993 and 1994.
F. SUMMATION
ATD funding increased until FY 1993. The 1994 budget brought a decrease
in funding for ATD. ETD continued to see funding increases for the entire period
observed. The increase in funding for ETD in 1994 offset the decrease in ATD and
allowed their combined funding to increase slightly. Both ATD and ETD are found
within the 6.3a account. Despite the decrease in 6.3a funding for 1994, advanced
prototyping in general received increases in funding.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A. CHANGES TO THE NAVY S&T BUDGET
1. Budget Requests
From 1984 to 1988, DoD RDT&E and, from 1984 to 1986, Navy RDT&E,
amounts requested increased. The 1989 through 1994 period is marked by declining
support for DoD and Navy RDT&E. While DoD and Navy RDT&E were generally
increasing, budget requests for 6.1 were lower in 1989 than in 1984 and budget
requests for 6.2 and 6.3a were lower in 1990 than in 1984.
Generally, budget requests for DoD and Navy RDT&E continued to
decline from 1989 until 1994. Budget requests for Navy S&T increased. A clear shift
in support is noted towards less mature types of technology research, while more
technologically mature types of research lost support.
2. Authorizations
Following a slightly different trend than budget requests, DoD RDT&E
authorizations generally increased through 1988. Until 1989, Navy S&T
authorizations generally declined, with the exception of an increase for 6.1 in 1986
and in 6.3a in 1988. DoD and Navy RDT&E authorizations gradually declined from
1989 through 1994. Navy S&T authorizations began increasing in 1990 and generally
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continued through 1994. Congressional authorizations didn't reduce Navy S&T as
occurred with the 1994 budget request.
3. Appropriations
DoD RDT&E appropriations increased until 1986 and Navy RDT&E
appropriations increased until 1985. This increase did not last as long as it did for
the budget request or authorization. The appropriations sent a clearer signal of
tighter RDT&E budgets to come. DoD and Navy RDT&E appropriations began a
period of gradual decreased funding.
Appropriations for 6.1 increased until 1986 and appropriations for 6.3a
increased only until 1985. Generally, in 1984 6.2 appropriations began a decline that
would last until 1990. Appropriations were at their low point for 6.1 in 1989 and for
6.3a in 1990. Thereafter, Navy S&T appropriations increased until 1993. The 1994
appropriation was similar to the budget request in that all types of research funding
declined.
B. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS
The growing importance of DoD research in support of technological
development in the commercial sector is increasingly visible. Technological transfer
programs such as the Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program and the
Navy Dual-Use Technology program are more prominent in recent Navy budgets.
SBIR funding increased in 1994 while funding for S&T declined. These programs
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represent a constraint on the Navy's ability to determine and procure the research
that best meets its needs.
C. ADVANCED PROTOTYPES
As funding for production of new weapon systems declines, the importance of
advanced prototypes or demonstrations of technology grow larger. The proposed
Advanced Concepts and Technology Demonstrations (ACDT) along with Advanced
Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) and Enhanced Technology Demonstrations
(ETDs) are forms of technology demonstrations that are funded in the 6.3a account.
Funding for ATDs and ETDs increased every year until 1994. Despite a 1994
funding increase for ATDs and ETDs combined, ETD funding increases had a more
pronounced effect. Both ATDs and ETDs are funded through 6.3a. Both types of
demonstrations continue to grow in importance. Despite a decline in funding for
6.3a in 1994, these demonstrations managed a modest increase.
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Two areas are suggested for further study: industrial policy and management
control of R&D.
1. Industrial Policy
Changes in the international security environment require the United
States to make some far reaching decisions about the size and character of the U.S.
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Armed Forces and the Defense Technology and Industrial Base (DTTB). In
supporting those forces, the DTIB has two basic functions:
1. Developing, producing, and supporting military systems in peacetime; and
2. Responding to increased military requirements in crisis or war. [Ref. 2:p. 3]
The key question facing the Nation's leaders is how to retain the technology and
industrial capabilities essential for the nation's defense and interests with reduced
defense budgets.
The DTIB is the combination of people, institutions, technological
expertise, and facilities used to design, develop, manufacture, and maintain the
weapons and supporting defense equipment needed to meet U.S. national security
objectives. [Ref. 8:pp. 2-3]
There is little debate among government policy makers that to remain
globally engaged U.S. must retain both sufficient military forces and the means to
arm and support those forces. Yet, it is certain that the defense budget will not grow
larger. With fewer funds available for military procurement, a shakeout will occur
in the defense industrial sector. [Ref. 2:pp. 3-4] The main justification for a federal
DTIB policy is to ensure that critical defense industrial sectors are capable of
producing weapon systems in a time of emergency.
The DTIB is not independent of the larger civilian industrial base. The
American industrial base is becoming increasingly global, with many multinational
firms. Except for crisis situations, developing and implementing a U.S. industrial
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strategy is complicated by the numerous groups that must cooperate. The Reagan
and Bush Administrations opposed an industrial policy. Both administrations
preferred to allow market forces to decide the fate of the defense industry. On the
other hand, some in Congress and in the current administration seem to favor an
industrial policy. [Ref. 10:pp. 9-11]
At the heart of this debate is the preservation of the technology or
industrial base. National security is firmly linked to the country's ability to produce
military hardware as needed. Reconstitution is the ability to expand the military
force to respond to a perceived threat. Reconstitution requires, among other things,
a DTIB that can produce weapons in a timely manner to support an expanding force
and the ability to mobilize reserve manpower. [Ref. 14:pp. 2-4]
An area of suggested study is examining of the impact of DoD or Navy
S&T funding on the industrial base. This study can assess the impact of DoD or
Navy S&T spending. Can present funding levels support the required industrial base
and have past funding levels been adequate to support the industrial base?
2. Management Control of R&D
Basic research has two characteristics. First, it is unplanned.
Management can at most specify general areas in which to conduct research or
explore. Second, there is a long time lag between basic research and new product
introduction. Exploratory research is relatively inexpensive and unstructured. Effort
quantification is difficult. [Ref. 22:p. 141] As one moves along the R&D continuum
to full scale production, controls become more formal and expenditures increase.
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Engineering, testing, and development are direct costs. Cost estimation is simplified
and management can implement process control more easily. [Ref. 22:pp. 141-142]
The primary research group receiving funding in an R&D phase reflects
the level of financial and managerial control. In basic research, where the stakes are
still low, most funding is allocated to universities. This reflects the unstructured,
relatively inexpensive nature of the work being done. In applied R&D, the funding
is split more evenly among universities, industry and in-house facilities. Industry
overwhelmingly controls development funding. This phase is characterized by strict
financial control tied to profitability.
In later research and development phases, industrial involvement is more
pronounced, due to the ease of linking R&D costs to certain products. It is much
more difficult to link a portion of a product's development cost to basic research.
This helps explains why private firms are not significantly involved in basic research.
Further study might inquire as to the possible measures of effectiveness of DoD and
Navy RDT&E expenditures. This study could access the impact of the different




BUDGET SUBMISSIONS (CURRENT DOLLARS)
Year DoD RDT&E Navy RDT&E 6.1 62 63a
1994 38,620,327 9,215,604 433,907 530,119 425,288
1993 38,812,700 8,517,800 473,569 622,534 418,533
1992 40,073,100 8,194,233 421,635 520,538 221,110
1991 38,092,800 9,017,100 401,158 466,335 199,605
1990 39,545,300 9,830,300 390,352 411,312 188,021
1989 38,157,100 9,216,200 356,752 415,887 204,024
1988 43,718,937 10,490,412 380,801 460,145 258,472
1987 41,929,900 10,586,800 388,831 462,217 196,272
1986 39,280,100 11,264,300 371,703 481,466 239,449
1985 33,985,037 9,826,076 350,346 477,826 286,399
1984 29,625,266 8,182,419 324,674 559,662 210,975
Sources: Presidential Budget Submissions for the fiscal years 1984 -1994.
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TABLE II
6.1 COMPARISON TO DOD AND NAVY RDT&E
Year 6.1 Increase DoD RDT&E 6.1 as a
% of DoD
RDT&E
Navy RDT&E 6.1 as a
% of Navy
RDT&E
1994 433,907 -10.76% 38,620,327 1.12% 9,215,604 4.71%
1993 486,210 8.61% 39,848,768 1.22% 8,745,175 5.56%
1992 444,341 2.25% 42,231,110 1.05% 8,635,507 5.15%
1991 434,342 - 0.73% 41,243,828 1.05% 9,762,993 4.45%
1990 437,516 5.00% 44,323,358 0.99% 11,018,045 3.97%
1989 415,650 -10.08% 44,456,600 0.93% 10,737,737 3.87%
1988 462,249 - 5.62% 53,069,843 0.87% 12,734,173 3.63%
1987 489,773 1.34% 52,815,090 0.93% 13,335,181 3.67%
1986 483,233 3.22% 51,066,173 0.95% 14,644,176 3.30%
1985 467,689 4.48% 45,367,824 1.03% 13,117,175 3.57%
1984 446,717 40,761,236 1.10% 11,258,144 3.97%
Sources: Presidential Budget Submissions for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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TABLE III
62 COMPARISON TO DOD AND NAVY RDT&E








1994 530,119 20.57% 38,620,327 1.37% 9,215,604 5.75%
1993 639,152 14.17% 39,848,768 1.60% 8,745,175 7.31%
1992 548,570 7.96% 42,231,110 1.30% 8,635,507 6.35%
1991 504,910 8.69% 41,243,828 1.22% 9,762,993 5.17%
1990 461,009 - 4.86% 44,323,358 1.04% 11,018,045 4.18%
1989 484,547 -13.25% 44,456,600 1.09% 10,737,737 4.51%
1988 558,564 -4.06% 53,069,843 1.05% 12,734,173 4.39%
1987 582,211 - 6.98% 52,815,090 1.10% 13,335,181 4.37%
1986 625,931 - 1.87% 51,066,173 1.23% 14,644,176 4.27%
1985 637,867 -17.16% 45,367,824 1.41% 13,117,175 4.86%
1984 770,036 40,761,236 1.89% 11,258,144 6.84%
Sources: Presidential Budget Submissions for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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TABLE IV
6.3A COMPARISON TO DOD AND NAVY RDT&E LEVELS







1994 425,288 - 1.03% 38,620,327 1.10% 9,215,604 4.61%
1993 429,705 45.77% 39,848,768 1.08% 8,745,175 4.91%
1992 233,017 7.25% 42,231,110 0.55% 8,635,507 2.70%
1991 216,116 2.49% 41,243,828 0.52% 9,762,993 2.21%
1990 210,739 -1135% 44,323,358 0.48% 11,018,045 1.91%
1989 237,707 -24.24% 44,456,600 0.53% 10,737,737 2.21%
1988 313,756 21.20% 53,069,843 0.59% 12,734,173 2.46%
1987 247,225 -20.58% 52,815,090 0.47% 13,335,181 1.85%
1986 311,296 -18.58% 51,066,173 0.61% 14,644,176 2.13%
1985 382,324 24.08% 45,367,824 0.84% 13,117,175 2.91%
1984 290,279 40,761,236 0.71% 11,258,144 2.58%
Sources: Presidential Budget Submissions for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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TABLE V
BUDGET AUTHORIZATION (CURRENT DOLLARS)
YEAR DoD RDT&E Navy RDT&E 6.1 62 63a
1994 37,885,398 8,736,970 445,407 562,019 419,527
1993 39,613,600 8,984,717 428,569 555,567 353,259
1992 40,056,600 8,633,875 410,267 545,302 232,473
1991 36,095,900 9,417,934 401,158 501,335 235,605
1990 38,227,000 10,140,400 411,917 526,121 216,705
1989 37,970,200 9,383,200 356,752 416,887 205,524
1988 40,511,225 9,947,151 346,229 402,552 258,406
1987 36,215,600 9,294,106 379,227 436,069 156,860
1986 35,488,754 10,106,401 371,703 469,132 214,813
1985 32,080,263 9,408,596 349,721 452,673 195,949
1984 27302,908 7,619,409 324,674 450,767 192,531
Sources: Congressional Budget Authorizations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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TABLE VI
6.1 COMPARISON TO DOD AND NAVY RDT&E







1994 445,407 1.23% 37,885,398 1.18% 8,736,970 5.10%
1993 440,009 1.74% 40,671,047 1.08% 9,224,555 4.77%
1992 432,361 -0.46% 42,213,721 1.02% 9,098,825 4.75%
1991 434,342 -5.92% 39,081,745 1.11% 10,196,984 4.26%
1990 461,687 9.97% 42,845,774 1.08% 11,365,613 4.06%
1989 415,650 - 1.10% 44,238,844 0.94% 10,932,308 3.80%
1988 420,283 -12.02% 49,176,044 0.85% 12,074,716 3.48%
1987 477,676 - 1.15% 45,617332 1.05% 11,706,898 4.08%
1986 483,233 3.39% 46,137,226 1.05% 13,138,847 3.68%
1985 466,855 4.31% 42,825,074 1.09% 12,559,867 3.72%
1984 446,717 37,565,916 1.19% 10,483,502 4.26%
Sources: Congressional Budget Authorizations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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TABLE VII
62 COMPARISON TO DOD AND NAVY RDT&E







1994 562,019 - 1.47% 37,885,398 1.48% 8,736,970 6.43%
1993 570397 - 0.75% 40,671,047 1.40% 9,224,555 6.18%
1992 574,668 5.54% 42,213,721 136% 9,098,825 6.32%
1991 542,805 - 7.95% 39,081,745 139% 10,196,984 5.32%
1990 589,690 17.63% 42,845,774 1.38% 11,365,613 5.19%
1989 485,712 - 0.61% 44,238,844 1.10% 10,932,308 4.44%
1988 488,653 -11.04% 49,176,044 0.99% 12,074,716 4.05%
1987 549,274 - 9.94% 45,617,332 1.20% 11,706,898 4.69%
1986 609,896 0.92% 46,137,226 132% 13,138,847 4.64%
1985 604,289 - 2.57% 42,825,074 1.41% 12,559,867 4.81%
1984 620,208 37,565,916 1.65% 10,483,502 5.92%
Sources: Congressional Budget Authorizations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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TABLE VIII
6.3A COMPARISON TO DOD AND NAVY RDT&E LEVELS







1994 419,527 15.67% 37,885,398 1.11% 8,736,970 4.80%
1993 362,689 32.45% 40,671,047 0.89% 9,224,555 3.93%
1992 244,992 - 4.12% 42,213,721 0.58% 9,098,825 2.69%
1991 255,094 5.03% 39,081,745 0.65% 10,196,984 2.50%
1990 242,888 1.41% 42,845,774 0.57% 11,365,613 2.14%
1989 239,455 -31.00% 44,238,844 0.54% 10,932,308 2.19%
1988 313,676 58.76% 49,176,044 0.64% 12,074,716 2.60%
1987 197,582 -29.25% 45,617,332 0.43% 11,706,898 1.69%
1986 279,268 633% 46,137,226 0.61% 13,138,847 2.13%
1985 261,579 - 1.25% 42,825,074 0.61% 12,559,867 2.08%
1984 264,902 27,565,916 0.71% 10,483,502 2.53%
Sources: Congressional Budget Authorizations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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TABLE IX
BUDGET APPROPRIATIONS (CURRENT DOLLARS)
YEAR DoD RDT&E Navy RDT&E 6.1 62 63a
1994 34,946,384 8,365,786 417,407 468,606 437,354
1993 37,962,158 8,930,381 447,257 612,910 432,059
1992 39,176,446 8,557,635 406,767 508,286 230,729
1991 35,722,072 9,037,684 395,703 503,469 227,055
1990 36,956,171 9,773,174 366,077 306,528 174,303
1989 37,442,733 9,382,312 346,752 445,849 188,349
1988 36,814,979 9,535,619 342,016 407,951 226,798
1987 35,804,214 9,326,416 365,668 429,728 132,072
1986 35,337,505 10,065,239 365,735 466,164 191,085
1985 31,187,071 9,172,622 342,698 443,190 221,477
1984 26,690,269 7,559,818 324,674 450,767 171,528
Sources: Congressional Budget Appropriations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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TABLE X
6.1 COMPARISON TO DOD AND NAVY RDT&E







1994 417,407 -9.10% 34,946,384 1.19% 8,365,786 4.99%
1993 459,196 6.65% 38,975,522 1.18% 9,168,769 5.01%
1992 428,672 0.06% 41,286,169 1.04% 9,018,479 4.75%
1991 428,435 4.23% 38,676,994 1.11% 9,785,279 4.38%
1990 410,308 1.54% 41,421,398 0.99% 10,954,017 3.75%
1989 403,999 -2.69% 43,624,2% 0.93% 10,931,273 3.70%
1988 415,169 -9.86% 44,689,219 0.93% 11,575,163 3.59%
1987 460,597 -3.13% 45,099,149 1.02% 11,747,595 3.92%
1986 475,475 3.78% 45,940,594 1.03% 13,085,334 3.63%
1985 457,480 2.35% 41,632,721 1.10% 12,244,856 3.74%
1984 446,717 36,722,990 1.22% 10,401,511 4.29%
Sources: Congressional Budget Appropriations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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TABLE XI
62 COMPARISON TO DOD AND NAVY RDT&E







1994 468,606 -25.53% 34,946,384 1.34% 8,365,786 5.60%
1993 629,271 14.88% 38,975,522 1.61% 9,168,769 6.86%
1992 535,658 - 1.73% 41,286,169 1.30% 9,018,479 5.94%
1991 545,116 36.97% 38,676,994 1.41% 9,785,279 5.57%
1990 «yT«5j«}OiT -33.86% 41,421,398 0.83% 10,954,017 3.14%
1989 519,456 4.67% 43,624,2% 1.19% 10,931,273 4.75%
1988 495,206 - 8.51% 44,689,219 1.11% 11,575,163 4.28%
1987 541,287 -10.68% 45,099,149 1.20% 11,747,595 4.61%
1986 606,037 2.38% 45,940,594 1.32% 13,085334 4.63%
1985 591,630 - 4.61% 41,632,721 1.42% 12,244,856 4.83%
1984 620,208 36,722,990 1.69% 10,401,511 5.96%
Sources: Congressional Budget Appropriations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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TABLE XII
63A COMPARISON TO DOD AND NAVY RDT&E







1994 437,354 - 1.41% 34,946,384 1.25% 8,365,786 5.23%
1993 443,592 45.19% 38,975,522 1.14% 9,168,769 4.84%
1992 243,154 - 1.09% 41,286,169 0.59% 9,018,479 2.70%
1991 245,837 20.53% 38,676,994 0.64% 9,785,279 2.51%
1990 195,363 -10.97% 41,421,398 0.47% 10,954,017 1.78%
1989 219,444 -20.29% 43,624,296 0.50% 10,931,273 2.01%
1988 275307 39.57% 44,689,219 0.62% 11,575,163 2.38%
1987 166358 -33.03% 45,099,149 0.37% 11,747,595 1.42%
1986 248,420 -15.98% 45,940,594 0.54% 13,085,334 0.54%
1985 295,657 20.18% 41,632,721 0.71% 12,244,856 0.71%
1984 236,004 36,722,990 0.64% 10,401,511 0.64%











1994 433,907 2.65% 445,407 - 6.29% 417,407
1993 486,210 -9.50% 440,009 4.36% 459,196
1992 444,341 -2.70% 432,361 - 0.85% 428,672
1991 434,342 0.00% 434,342 - 1.36% 428,435
1990 437,516 5.52% 461,687 -11.13% 410,308
1989 415,650 0.00% 415,650 -2.80% 403,999
1988 462,249 -9.08% 420,283 - 1.22% 415,169
1987 489,773 -2.47% 477,676 - 3.58% 460,597
1986 483,233 0.00% 483,233 - 1.61% 475,475
1985 467,689 -0.18% 466,855 - 2.01% 457,480
1984 446,717 0.00% 446,717 0.00% 446,717
Sources: Presidential Budget Submissions for the fiscal years
1984-1994.
Congressional Budget Authorizations for the fiscal years
1984-1994.












1994 530,119 6.02% 562,019 -16.62% 468,606
1993 639,152 -10.76% 570,397 10.32% 629,271
1992 548,570 4.76% 574,668 - 6.79% 535,658
1991 504,910 7.51% 542,805 0.43% 545,116
1990 461,009 27.91% 589,690 -41.74% 343,564
1989 484,547 0.24% 485,712 6.95% 519,456
1988 558,564 -1232% 488,653 134% 495,206
1987 582,211 - 5.66% 549,274 - 1.45% 541,287
1986 625,931 -2.56% 609,8% - 0.63% 606,037
1985 637,867 - 5.26% 604,289 -2.09% 591,630
1984 770,036 -19.46% 620,208 0.00% 620,208
Sources: Presidential Budget Submissions for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
Congressional Budget Authorizations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.











1994 425,288 -135% 419,527 4.25% 437354
1993 429,705 -15.60% 362,689 22.31% 443,592
1992 233,017 5.14% 244,992 - 0.75% 243,154
1991 216,116 18.04% 255,094 - 3.63% 245,837
1990 210,739 15.26% 242,888 -19.57% 195,363
1989 237,707 0.74% 239,455 - 8.36% 219,444
1988 313,756 - 0.03% 313,676 -12.23% 275,307
1987 247,225 -20.08% 197,582 -15.80% 166,358
1986 311,2% -10.29% 279,268 -11.05% 248,420
1985 382,324 -31.58% 261,579 13.03% 295,657
1984 290,279 - 8.74% 264,902 -10.91% 236,004
Sources: Presidential Budget Submissions for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
Congressional Budget Authorizations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
Congressional Budget Appropriations for the fiscal years 1984-1994.
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TABLE XVI
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS (CONSTANT)
YEAR 63A ATD GENERIC MC ATD
1990 256,639 18,944 18,944
1991 221,688 20,510 20,510 5,477
1992 251,002 35,649 18,799 16,850
1993 463,946 55,336 29,311 26,025
1994 425,288 49,535 13,720 35,815
All figures are in thousands of 1994 dollars.











1991 8.27% 8.27% 0.00%
1992 73.81% - 8.34% 207.62%
1993 55.23% 55.92% 54.45%
1994 -10.48% -53.19% 37.62%




ENHANCED TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS (CONSTANT)
YEAR 6.3A ETD TECH DEMO ADVASW
1990 256,639 41,691 41,691
1991 221,688 17,619 17,619
1992 251,002 53,649 53,649
1993 463,946 86,436 9,601 76,836
1994 425,288 100,171 50,999 49,172
All figures are in thousands of 1994 dollars.




YEAR ETD TECH DEMO ADVASW
1991 - 57.74% 0.00% - 57.74%
1992 204.50% 0.00% 204.50%
1993 61.11% 0.00% 43.22%
1994 15.89% 431.21% - 36.00%
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